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How Do Family Ownership, Management, and Control Affect Firm Value? 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994-2000, we find that family ownership 
creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm, or as its chairman 
with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder 
premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that 
the classic owner-manager conflict in non-family firms is more costly than the conflict between 
family and non-family shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between 
family and non-family shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-
manager conflict in non-family firms. 
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Several recent studies show that family firms are as least as common among public 
corporations around the world as are widely held and other non-family firms (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 
2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).1 Whether family firms are more or 
less valuable than non-family firms remains an open question. Among large U.S. corporations, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that family firms have a lower Tobin’s q than non-family 
firms, while Anderson and Reeb (2003) find the opposite. In other economies, the evidence is 
scarce but also mixed (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and 
Lang, 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003).  
We begin our paper by noting that if we are to understand whether and when family firms 
create or destroy value, we must differentiate among three fundamental elements in the definition 
of family firms: Ownership, management, and control. Using detailed data from the proxy filings 
of all Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 2000, we find that whether family firms trade at a 
premium or discount relative to non-family firms depends on how these three elements are 
incorporated into the definition of a family firm.  
We then examine how family ownership, management, and control contribute to firm 
value. The evidence thus far raises questions about each of these three elements. First, does 
                                                 
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report on the identity of the largest shareholders in a sample of 456 of the Fortune 500 
corporations in 1980: 207 are institutions, 149 are families represented on the board of directors, and 100 are other 
corporations or family holding companies not represented on the board. La Porta et al. (1999) examine the 
ownership and control structures of the 20 largest publicly traded firms in each of the 27 generally richest 
economies, as well as of 10 smaller firms in some of these countries. To establish who controls the firms, they look 
at the identities of the ultimate owners of capital and voting rights. They find that 36 percent of the large firms in 
their sample are widely held, 30 percent are controlled by families or individuals, 18 percent are controlled by the 
State, five percent are controlled by a widely-held financial institution, and five percent are controlled by a widely-
held corporation. For the smaller firms and using a less restrictive definition of control (a 10 percent threshold as 
opposed to 20 percent), the fraction of family-controlled firms in their sample rises to 53 percent.  Claessens et al. 
(2000) examine 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and find that over two thirds of firms are controlled 
by families or individuals. Faccio and Lang (2002) analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 public 
corporations in 13 Western European countries and find that 44 percent of firms are family-controlled, and 34 
percent are widely held. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that founding families are present in one third of the S&P 
500 corporations during 1992–1999.  
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family ownership per se create or destroy value? Because family ownership is rarely found in 
isolation from family management and/or control, we cannot ascertain the effect of family 
ownership per se from prior studies.2  
Second, does family management create or destroy value? Because family management 
eliminates the separation between owners and managers, classic agency theory would predict a 
positive effect on value of family management (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Yet, this effect may be offset by the costs of family management if hired professionals are 
better managers than family founders or their heirs (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). Smith 
and Amoako-Adu (1999) and Pérez-González (2001) find that family descendant-CEOs destroy 
shareholder value not just relative to founders but also relative to non-family managers.  
Third, does family control create or destroy value? Families can use their controlling 
position in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of non-family shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Claessens et al. (2002) show that this private benefits extraction reduces the 
overall value of the firm. Yet, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find no such negative effect of 
control beyond the effect of family ownership. 
We find that family ownership only creates value for all of the firm’s shareholders when 
the founder is still active in the firm either as CEO, or as chairman with a hired CEO. When 
family firms are run by descendant-CEOs, minority shareholders in those firms are worse off 
than they would be in non-family firms where they would be exposed to the classic agency 
conflict with managers. This result holds even when the founder is present in the firm as 
chairman. Founders create the most value when no control-enhancing mechanisms facilitate the 
                                                 
2 For instance, Claessens et al. (2002) and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) distinguish between family ownership of 
cash flow rights and ownership of voting rights (which can proxy for control), but do not separate these from the 
effect of family management. Anderson and Reeb (2003) examine the effects of family ownership and management 
but do not distinguish ownership from control. 
 
 3
expropriation of non-family shareholders. Examples include multiple share classes with 
differential voting rights, pyramids, cross-holdings, or voting agreements. Descendant-CEOs 
destroy value whether or not the family has established control-enhancing mechanisms.  
We also find that the negative effect of descendant-CEOs on firm value is entirely 
attributable to second-generation family firms. The incremental contribution to q of third-
generation descendant-CEOs firms is not significant. Yet, the incremental contribution of fourth-
generation descendant-CEOs firms is positive and significant, which points to a non-monotonic 
effect of generation on firm value. 
Our results are robust to the use of alternative specifications and econometric techniques, 
including multivariate OLS regressions of q and industry-adjusted q on continuous and 
categorical measures of family ownership and control, fixed- and random-effects panel data 
models, and treatment effect models to control for the endogeneity of family ownership, 
management, and control. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe our data and variables. 
Section II presents the results of our analyses. Section III concludes. 
I. Data and Variables 
A. Sample 
Our sample comprises a panel of 2,808 firm-year observations from all 508 Fortune 500 
firms during the period 1994–2000. These are firms that are in the Fortune 500 in any of those 
years; have at least two years of data in Compustat on sales, assets, and market value during that 
period; and whose primary industry is not financial services, utilities, or government. For those 
firms that meet our criteria we include in our sample all years with available data between 1994 
and 2000, even if the firm is not in the Fortune 500 list in a particular year. 
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These firms are among the largest in the world, listed on an exchange in a country with a 
high degree of shareholder protection, a likely target of investment for index funds, and generally 
old and thus more difficult to maintain under family control. For all these reasons, our estimates 
of the relative importance of family firms will be conservative.  
Our data collection process involves two distinct phases. In Phase I, we build a database 
at the individual shareholder level which covers, for each firm-year in the sample, all of its 
insiders (officers and/or directors), blockholders (owners of five percent or more of the firm’s 
equity), and the five largest institutional shareholders. We compile our Phase I data set from four 
sources: proxy statements for detailed information about blockholder and insider ownership, and 
about the firm’s voting and board structures; Spectrum data on institutional holdings; Hoover’s, 
corporate websites, and web searches about company histories and family relationships; and 
various SEC filings, to clarify the identity of ultimate owners whenever firms are controlled 
through intermediate corporations or “pyramids”. This data set comprises 52,787 shareholder-
firm-year observations. 
Phase II of our data collection process centers on aggregating our shareholder-level 
database from Phase I into firm-years, and obtaining data on a broad range of firm characteristics 
from three other sources: Compustat, CRSP, and the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC), which provides data on governance provisions in charters, bylaws, and SEC filings. This 
aggregation results in 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 different firms. 
Table I describes all variables in our data set that we use in the analyses. Three groups of 
variables that are central to our study merit further description: family holdings of shares and 
votes, the family firm definitions, and our dependent variable, Tobin’s q. 
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B. Family Holdings of Shares and Votes 
In this paper, the term “family” refers to either the founder’s family or to an individual or 
family that becomes the largest non-institutional shareholder in the firm through the acquisition 
of a block of shares. Only in a few cases (e.g. Nordstrom or Murphy Oil) does the proxy itself 
provide an aggregate figure for the percentage of shares held by the family as a group. Therefore, 
we compute this figure by aggregating, across all classes of shares and across all family members 
or representatives, the shares held by the family with investment and/or voting power.  
We consider as family representatives all co-trustees that are beneficial owners by virtue 
of their association to the family in those trusts, as well as family-designated directors. We 
include the shares of family representatives because they owe their job, or position as beneficial 
owners, to the family. Therefore, we can assume that their incentives are aligned with those of 
the family. For instance, in the Washington Post during 1994, a significant fraction of the shares 
held by the controlling family (Katherine Graham’s) were held in trusts in which Katherine 
Graham, her son Donald Graham, and director George Gillespie were co-trustees. We consider 
Gillespie as a family representative and include all shares held in such trusts.3  
On the other hand, we do not include any shares over which the family shares investment 
or voting power with a non-member of the family that cannot reasonably be considered as a 
family representative. For example, in 1994, Berkshire Hathaway (where Warren Buffett and his 
wife owned approximately 43.8 percent) was the beneficial owner of, and held investment power 
over 1,727,765 (14.8 percent) shares of Class B Stock in the Washington Post. Pursuant to an 
agreement dated 1977 and extended in 1985, Warren Buffett, Berkshire, and its subsidiaries 
granted Donald Graham a proxy to vote such shares at his discretion. Because we cannot 
                                                 
3 We include both the shares over which family representatives share investment or voting power with the family 
and those they hold individually, but the latter are typically insignificant relative to the family’s overall holdings. In 
contrast, including or excluding the shares over which they share investment or voting power with the family can 
significantly affect the estimated family holdings. 
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consider Buffett as a Graham family representative, we include his shares in our measure of the 
percentage of votes held by the family, but not in the percentage of shares held by the family. 
C. Family Firm Definitions 
To analyze how family ownership, management, and control affect firm value, we 
consider nine different definitions of a family firm that incorporate all or some of these elements. 
We then use the definitions to construct dummy variables that equal one when the firm meets the 
definition and zero otherwise. The definitions are listed in the first column of Table II. These 
range from the least restrictive one (Definition 1), under which a family or individual owns any 
amount of shares, to a very restrictive definition (Definition 9), under which the family is the 
largest vote-holder, has at least 20 percent of the votes, has family officers and family directors, 
and is in the second or later generation. Companies such as The New York Times, Hasbro, 
Timken, Cox Communication, and Coors fall under the latter definition of family firms, and also 
under most of the other definitions, which are generally less restrictive. At the other extreme are 
companies such as Tektronik during 1994–1996, where the founder’s widow was the largest 
individual shareholder, but the largest shareholder of all was an institution that owned between 
three and five times as many shares as did the widow.  A company like Tektronik can only 
qualify as a family firm under a broad definition such as 1, but not under any other definition.  
D. Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets. 
Following recent finance studies, we use the firm’s market-to-book value as a proxy for Tobin’s 
q, and we use the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferred stock and 
debt as a proxy for the firm’s market value.4 For firms with a single class of shares, the market 
                                                 
4 This measure is being increasingly used to avoid the arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates 
that more sophisticated measures of q require, and also in light of the high correlation between adjusted and 
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value of common equity is the product of the share price at fiscal year-end times the number of 
common shares outstanding. We obtain both items from Compustat. For firms with multiple 
classes of tradable shares, the procedure is the same for each class of stock and only requires 
adding the market value of all classes (Zingales, 1995, Nenova, 2003). For firms with multiple 
share classes, including at least one class that is not publicly traded, we multiply the total shares 
outstanding of all classes by the share price of the tradable shares to estimate the market value of 
common equity. This approach, which is also used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2004), 
amounts to valuing the non-tradable shares at the same price per share as the tradable shares.5  
E. Descriptive Statistics 
Table III provides descriptive statistics for our sample. When we consider the least 
restrictive definition of a family firm (Definition 1 in Table II), the mean q of family firms is 
0.23 higher than that of non-family firms, and the difference is statistically significant. However, 
when we consider the most restrictive definition (Definition 9), the relation is reversed, and 
family firms become significantly less valuable on average than non-family firms.  
Families own an average of 16 percent of the equity of the Fortune 500 firms in which 
they are present. They own 28 percent of the equity of the subset of family firms that qualify as 
such under the most restrictive definition. Under both definitions there are significant differences 
between family and non-family firms in all variables related to governance and control issues. 
Control-Enhancing Mechanisms is a dummy that indicates the presence of dual share classes 
with differential voting rights, pyramids, cross-holdings, or voting agreements that enable the 
                                                                                                                                                             
unadjusted measures. For instance, Chung and Pruitt (1994) find that this proxy explains at least 96.6 percent of the 
variability of Lindenberg and Ross’s (1981) measure of Tobin’s q.   
5 Two alternative approaches have been used to value non-tradable shares. One is to ignore the shares outstanding of 
all non-tradable classes (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This approach amounts to valuing the non-tradable shares at 
zero, and therefore underestimates q for firms with non-tradable share classes. Another approach is to value the non-
tradable shares at the average premium on traded supervoting shares relative to the common traded shares, e.g. two 
to 10 percent (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). This approach ignores the liquidity discount that non-tradable shares 
are subject to, and therefore overestimates q for firms with this class of shares.  
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family’s controlling stake to exceed its ownership stake. These mechanisms are used by 50 
percent of family firms under Definition 1, and by 76 percent of firms under Definition 9.  
The Percentage of Family Voteholdings in Excess of Shares Owned quantifies the extent 
to which the controlling and ownership stakes differ, which is 17 percent (56 percent) on average 
for all family firms under Definition 1 (Definition 9). Not surprisingly, family firms under any 
definition make significantly more use of these mechanisms than do non-family firms.  
The Governance Index is the measure of corporate governance developed by Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) based on the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) data. It 
measures the number of governance provisions in the firm’s charter, bylaws, or SEC filings that 
reduce shareholder rights. In our sample, the index ranges between two and 16 and is 
significantly greater for non-family firms regardless of the definition of family firm used. (We 
note that the provisions included in the IRRC data are largely anti-takeover and officer/director 
protection provisions).6  
Taken together, the differences in means in the last three variables are consistent with the 
view that minority shareholders’ risk of expropriation comes from two different sources in 
family and non-family firms, controlling (family) shareholders in the former and management in 
the latter. These differences in corporate governance and control may explain part of the 
valuation differential between family and non-family firms. 
 The average equity ownership by non-family blockholders is significantly lower in 
family firms than in non-family firms. Perhaps more surprisingly, under Definition 1, the mean 
                                                 
6 These provisions are described in detail in Gompers et al. (2003), and include: (1) tactics for delaying hostile 
bidders such as staggered boards, special meetings, requirement of written consent, or “blank checks”; (2) 
officer/director protection provisions such as compensation plans, contracts, golden parachutes, indemnification, 
liability, or severanceagreements; (3) voting provisions including secret ballots, supermajorities, unequal voting 
rights, and the absence of cumulative voting; (4) other anti-takeover provisions such as antigreenmail, directors’ 
duties, fair price, poison pills, and silver or pension parachutes; and (5) state laws that make certain governance 
provisions apply automatically. 
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level of ownership of non-family blockholders in family firms is exactly the same as the mean 
family ownership in those firms (16 percent). But under Definition 9, the mean percentage of 
stock owned by families (28 percent) is much higher than the mean blockholder ownership in 
either family or non-family firms (11 percent and 20 percent, respectively).  
Family firms also have a significantly lower proportion of independent directors than do 
non-family firms. This finding suggests that independent directors provide better protection of 
minority shareholder rights against the threat of managers than the protection they provide 
against the threat of large shareholders. 
 Table III also shows that under Definition 1, family firms are significantly less prone to 
being diversified than are their non-family counterparts. Consistent with their diversification 
profile, family firms’ stock returns show higher levels of risk, both systematic and idiosyncratic. 
This pattern contrasts with the conventional wisdom that families may be inclined to diversify 
their corporations to make up for their lack of personal diversification. Under Definition 9, 
however, we observe that the two groups of firms are equally prone to diversify. 
Also, under Definition 1, family firms have significantly lower dividend rates and 
leverage than do non-family firms, but not under Definition 9. Both dividends and debt can play 
a role in limiting minority shareholder expropriation by removing corporate wealth from family 
control (Jensen, 1986; Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001). Yet, our findings suggest that dividend 
policy and capital structure in U.S. family firms exacerbate rather than dampen the problem.  
On average, under Definition 1 family firms are younger and have fewer assets than do 
the non-family firms. These relations are also reversed when we consider the restrictive 
definition of a family firm, and again the differences are statistically significant. We note that, of 
the family firm-years in our sample, 32 percent are in their first generation, 32 percent are in 
their second generation, 21 percent are in their third generation, and 14 percent are in their fourth 
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generation. When we measure firm size by sales or number of employees, we find that non-
family firms are larger than family firms under both definitions, but the differences are only 
significant under Definition 1.  
Under Definition 1, family firms have significantly higher sales growth and profitability 
than do non-family firms. Again, the relations are the reverse under Definition 9, but the 
difference in profitability is not significant. 
 Table IV shows the industry distribution of family and non-family firms in our sample. 
Although family firms are present in all sectors of the economy, they are not uniformly 
distributed within and across industries. There are 13 two-digit SIC code industries in which 
there are no family firms under either definition. There are two other industries, furniture and 
fixtures (SIC code 25) and water transportation (SIC code 44), in which the proportion of family 
firms is the same under both definitions of a family firm. In all other industries, the proportion of 
family firms depends on the definition of family firm used. For instance, there are 14 industries 
with no family firms under Definition 9 but a positive proportion of family firms under 
Definition 1. The most extreme example of this divergence is apparel and other textile products 
(SIC code 23), which is entirely composed of family firms under Definition 1 but has none under 
Definition 9. 
II. Results 
A. Prevalence and Value of Family Firms and Non-Family Firms 
For each of our nine alternative definitions of family firms, Table II reports on both their 
prevalence in the sample and their value relative to non-family firms. As a proportion of the 
sample the prevalence of family firms ranges between seven and 37 percent for the most and 
least restrictive definitions, respectively. The 37 percent of family firms under Definition 1 
represents 1,041 firm-year observations from 193 different firms, of which 172 are family firms 
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during the entire sample period, and 21 change their status from family to non-family firms 
during the period. There are 315 firms that are non-family firms for the entire period. The seven 
percent of family firms that qualify as such under the most restrictive definition are 206 firm-
year observations from 47 different firms, of which 25 are family firms during the entire period, 
and 22 change status.7 
Next we examine the value premiums (discounts) of family firms, i.e. the positive 
(negative) difference in mean q between family firms and non-family firms. Using our least 
restrictive definition (“the family owns shares”), we find a statistically significant premium of 
0.23, or about 11.3 percent of the average q for the sample, which equals 2.03.  
However, this result is extremely sensitive to variations in the definition used. When we 
use the most restrictive definition of a family firm, the premium turns into a significant discount 
of exactly the same size, -0.23. Although this is the largest discount observed across definitions, 
it is not exceptional: Two other definitions also yield discounts, and one of them is also 
significant (Definition 5, “the family has any shares, and is in second or later generation”). The 
largest premium appears under Definition 6 (“the family is the largest voteholder and has family 
officers and family directors”). The differences in median q (column [i] in Table I) range 
between a significant premium of 0.15 (for Definition 1) and a nonsignificant discount of 0.01 
(for Definition 9).  
                                                 
7 The two groups of firms that change status are completely non-overlapping. All except one of the 22 firms that 
change status under Definition 9 do so as a result of first-to-second generation successions (which bring them into 
the family category under that definition), or as a result of changes in the board or management. (We note that 
Definition 9 requires that the family have both managers and directors. Therefore, a firm of which the family that 
ceases to be involved in management would switch to the non-family category under this definition even if it 
maintained a positive level of ownership (less that 20 percent) and/or directors in the board.) The exception is 
Mohawk Industries, which switches from non-family to family-controlled in 1995 as a result of its acquisition of 
Aladdin, which was itself controlled by Alan Lorberbaum and his family. Prior to the merger, the largest shareholder 
of Mohawk was Citicorp, with a 31 percent ownership stake in the firm. After the merger, Citicorp’s stake is 
reduced to 18 percent and the Lorberbaum family as a group becomes the largest shareholder with a combined stake 
of 42 percent. Because Alan Lorberbaum’s son Jeffrey becomes a director in Mohawk, the company counts as a 
second-generation family firm. 
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Our finding that the existence of a family firm premium in our sample is contingent on 
the definition of a family firm used may help explain the discrepancy among earlier studies: 
Holderness and Sheehan’s (1988) finding of a family discount is based on a definition of family 
firms as firms with families or individuals as majority shareholders. Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) 
finding of a premium is based on a definition of family firms similar to our Definition 1 (firms in 
which a family has any shares).  
To examine the robustness of the result to alternative model specifications and estimation 
techniques, we first estimate multivariate regressions in which we include a range of variables 
that can affect firm value independently of family ownership. These variables are the Gompers-
Ishii-Metrick (2003) Governance Index; the percentage of ownership in the firm by non-family 
blockholders; the proportion of non-family outside directors on the board; market risk, corporate 
diversification, R&D expenditures relative to sales; capital expenditures relative to property, 
plant, and equipment; dividends relative to the book value of equity; leverage; firm size 
(measured as log of assets); and the firm’s age since its founding.  
We use two alternative ways to control for industry and year, which Table IV suggests 
can be important. First, we include industry and year dummies for the 53 two-digit SIC codes 
and seven years in the sample (excluding one category for each). Second, we use industry-
adjusted q as our dependent variable instead of the unadjusted Tobin’s q of the prior analyses, 
and exclude the industry and year dummies. We construct industry-adjusted q as the difference 
between the firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed q’s of its segments, where a 
segment’s imputed q is the industry average q, and q is measured as before. We compute 
industry averages at the most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of five single-
segment firms in the industry-year. 
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Table V shows that the univariate results reported in Table II are confirmed in a 
multivariate setting. In the pooled OLS regression with industry and year dummies, the 
coefficient on the family firm dummy under Definition 1 is 0.2, but the same coefficient under 
Definition 9 is -0.23, as before. Using industry-adjusted q also yields a difference across 
definitions: Under Definition 1 the premium grows to 0.33 and remains highly significant; under 
Definition 9 the discount is negative (-0.10) but nonsignificant.  
The coefficients on all independent variables have the same sign and similar size across 
all the specifications shown in Table V. The Governance Index, which proxies for weak 
corporate governance in firms, is significant and negatively related to firm value, as in Gompers 
et al. (2003). Non-family blockholder ownership also has a significant and negative coefficient, 
which runs contrary to the notion that outside blockholders play a monitoring role over families 
and/or managers. After controlling for other firm characteristics, we find that the proportion of 
independent directors on the board does not significantly affect firm value.  
As a second robustness check, we estimate multivariate regressions using a continuous 
measure of family ownership instead of the family firm dummies of Definitions 1 and 9. In 
addition to all the control variables used in the previous multivariate regressions, in this second 
set of regressions we use a continuous measure of the percentage of votes owned by the family in 
excess of the percentage of shares they own to proxy for the private benefits of family 
shareholders. Following McConnell and Servaes (1990), to capture any potential non-linearities 
in the relation between ownership and performance, we also estimate a quadratic specification. 
Table VI reports the results of these regressions. We find a positive and significant 
coefficient on family ownership both in the linear and in the quadratic specifications, as well as a 
negative coefficient on the quadratic term, which suggests the presence of a non-linear effect. 
However, we find that the benefits of continuous family ownership are at least partially offset by 
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the costs of family excess voteholdings: The coefficient on the excess voteholdings variable is 
negative and significant. This finding suggests that minority shareholders in family firms pay a 
price for the family’s appropriation of private benefits. What is surprising about our result is that 
we find it in a sample of firms that trade in U.S. stock markets, where the degree of shareholder 
protection is very high relative to, among others, the Asian economies in Claessens et al.’s 
(2002) sample, the emerging markets considered in Lins (2003), or the Swedish economy studied 
by Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003).8 Nevertheless, our result is consistent with the finding that, in 
U.S. dual-class companies, firm value is increasing in cash flow ownership but decreasing in 
voting ownership (Gompers et al., 2004). 
Table VI also shows that our results are robust to the use of industry and year dummies or 
industry-adjusted q as alternative ways to control for industry and year effects. Although not 
reported here, we note that the results in Table VI are also robust to the use of firm fixed effects, 
random effects, and instrumental variables as alternative estimation techniques. 
Table VII reports on our third robustness check, which estimates the same multivariate 
specifications as in Table V but uses fixed- and random-effects models to deal with the panel 
nature of our data. The random-effects coefficients on the family firm dummies are similar to 
those reported earlier: A positive and significant premium of 0.2 under Definition 1, and a 
negative but nonsignificant discount of -0.12 under Definition 9. The fixed-effects coefficients 
on the family firm dummies are qualitatively similar (a 0.13 premium and a -0.08 discount), but 
are statistically nonsignificant. This nonsignificance is to be expected, since the fixed-effects 
coefficients are only identified from within-firm changes from the family to the non-family 
                                                 
8 Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find exactly the opposite result for their sample of Swedish firms: Family ownership 
alone has a negative impact on firm value, but the excess control over ownership does not significantly affect value. 
Nevertheless, they also interpret their findings as evidence of agency costs of controlling shareholders. This 
counterintuitive result may be attributable to the specifics of corporate Sweden: Of the 27 countries in La Porta et 
al.’s (1999) sample, Sweden exhibits the highest deviation from the one-share one-vote rule. Over three fourths of 
the firms in Cronqvist and Nilsson’s sample have dual share classes with differential voting rights. 
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category, or vice versa. As noted before, these changes are rare in our sample (21 under 
Definition 1, 22 under Definition 9). The coefficients on the control variables under both the 
fixed-effects and the random-effects models are also qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table VI, although the size and significance of the estimates sometimes vary. 
Our final sensitivity analysis addresses the endogeneity of family ownership. Families 
may be inclined to reduce or even divest completely their holdings for private reasons, such as 
seeking greater personal diversification, or a loss of interest in the company if they either cannot, 
or are no longer able to, exploit its “amenity potential” (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In addition, 
one can argue that, in the presence of information asymmetries, families may have incentives to 
“abandon the ship” if they foresee a loss in value. If such were the case, then the positive relation 
that we observe between family ownership and value under Definition 1 and under the 
continuous ownership measure could be subject to a reverse causality interpretation. On the other 
hand, ownership concentration within a single family is likely to be more constrained than it 
would be among a few independent owners, and a non-family firm cannot become a family firm 
unless a family or individual (i.e., not a firm or institution) acquires a controlling block in it 
through a major transaction. As a result, endogeneity may be less of a concern for family 
ownership than it is for ownership concentration in general (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
Nevertheless, controlling for endogeneity or self-selection (of families in or out of firms) seems 
imperative. 
Because our main result is based on a dichotomous measurement of family ownership, 
we use a treatment effects model to address this issue. We use a probit model to estimate the 
propensity of firms in our sample to be family-owned under one of the two extreme definitions. 
We then use the information from the model to estimate the selectivity-corrected (“treatment”) 
effect of family ownership on value.  
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We use Heckman’s (1979) two-step method to estimate the treatment effects model. 
Because Heckman’s method, like instrumental variables, relies on exclusion restrictions for the 
identification of the model, we include two variables in the probit model that we do not include 
in the second-stage (Tobin’s q) regression. These are idiosyncratic risk and the natural logarithm 
of firm age. We use idiosyncratic risk as an instrument because Tobin’s q, as a measure of firm 
value, should be a function of expected cash flows and expected returns. According to the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the latter should only be a function of market risk, but not 
of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk. Yet, family firm owners, who are imperfectly diversified, 
should care about both types of risk. We also use firm age as an instrument because it is not clear 
how it should be related to firm value, if at all, and our OLS and random-effects regressions 
yield a nonsignificant coefficient for it. However, the likelihood that a firm remains under family 
ownership clearly should decrease as firm age increases. Our results are similar to those reported 
here if we use only one of these two instruments. They are also robust to using a propensity 
score-matching estimator, which does not require exclusion restrictions for identification 
(Villalonga, 2004). 
Table VIII reports our estimation results from the treatment effect models. The 
coefficient of the self-selection parameter λ is statistically nonsignificant under both definitions. 
This suggests that the one-stage estimates of the family premium or discount are not significantly 
affected by a selectivity bias. In fact, after controlling for the endogeneity of family ownership, 
the effect on Tobin’s q is larger than any of the one-stage estimates: There is a premium of 0.78 
for family firms under Definition 1, and a discount of -0.26 under Definition 9. 
B. Value Effect of Founders and Descendants in the Roles of Chairman or CEO  
 A comparison of Definitions 5, 6, and 9 in Table II suggests that the most likely driver of 
the differences in results is whether or not we define family firms to include first generation 
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firms. A positive first-generation effect, if confirmed, would be consistent with recent findings of 
a value premium in founder-CEO firms relative to other firms (Palia and Ravid, 2002; Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira, 2004; Fahlenbrach, 2004). It would also be consistent with the finding of 
negative abnormal returns to the appointment of family descendants as managers (Smith and 
Amoako-Adu, 1999; Pérez-González, 2001).  
 These findings raise several questions related to family ownership and management. 
First, is there a positive family effect on firm value beyond that of founders? Second, does the 
positive effect of founders require that they occupy the CEO position in the firm, or do non-
founder CEOs with a founder as Chairman of the Board fare equally well (or perhaps even 
better)? Third, is the effect of descendants neutral or negative? Fourth, does the effect of 
descendants vary across generations? The answers to these questions may help us understand 
why the family effect is negative when we use a definition like our most restrictive one, which 
reserves the term “family firms” for those in their second and later generation only.  
Table IX reports on the prevalence of founders, descendants, and outside hires in the 
roles or chairman and/or CEO in family firms. The table also reports the mean q of firms for the 
six combinations of founders, descendants, and hires in the roles of chairman and CEO. Firms 
with a founder-CEO (and chairman) have the highest average q, 3.12. The q of firms where the 
founder remains as chairman but hires an outside CEO is almost as high (2.81), and not 
significantly different from the previous (t-statistic of 0.76). When the founder remains as 
chairman but is succeeded by a descendant in the role of CEO, the resulting mean q is the lowest 
across all categories (0.61). As a caveat, we note that this last finding is based only on ten 
observations and therefore has no statistical significance. Altogether, our results confirm prior 
findings that founders bring valuable skills to their firms (Morck et al., 2000; Palia and Ravid, 
2002; Adams et al., 2004; Fahlenbrach, 2004). However, when we look at the chairman position 
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as well as at the CEO’s, what we find is that founders’ skills are almost as valuable when they 
bring them to the firm through their position as chairman but have a hired CEO in place.  
Table X contains more formal tests of the value effect of chairman/CEO founders and 
descendants, and of family firm generations. The table reports regression coefficients on dummy 
variables for different family firm categories from multivariate OLS regressions of Tobin’s q on 
those dummies and for the same control variables included in Tables V and VII. The coefficients 
on the control variables are not reported in this table, but are similar to those in Table V.  
The first two columns in Table X report on the effect of family firm generation on firm 
value. By “Generation” we mean the latest generation of family members that are active in the 
firm as managers, directors, or blockholders, in relation to the founder. Thus, the concept is 
slightly different from the previous distinction between founder and descendant chairman/CEOs: 
A firm with a founder-chairman and CEO may be in its second generation if the founder’s 
descendants are also active in the firm’s management or board of directors.  
In the regression reported in column [a], the generation dummies equal one if the firm is 
a family firm in the generation indicated by the dummy’s name (e.g., second), and zero 
otherwise. In the regression in column [b], the generation dummies equal one if the firm is a 
family firm in that generation or in a later one, and zero otherwise. Hence, the coefficients in 
column [a] measure the difference between family firms in each generation and in non-family 
firms, and the coefficients in column [b] measure the incremental contribution to q of each 
generation.  
The results show that under Definition 1, the positive, significant effect of family 
ownership on firm value is entirely attributable to first generation family firms. Second-
generation family firms are not significantly different from non-family firms, and yet their 
marginal contribution to q relative to first-generation family firms is negative and significant. 
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The marginal contribution of later generations is also negative but not significant, i.e., there is no 
significant drop in q when one moves from second-generation family firms to third-generation 
firms, or from third-generation firms to fourth-generation firms. 
Columns [c] and [d] in Table X show the value effect of founders, descendants, and hires 
in the role of CEO, after controlling for the influence of other variables. The results confirm that 
founder-CEO firms are the most valuable of all (family and non-family firms); descendant-CEO 
firms are the least valuable (and significantly so); and family firms with a hired CEO are not 
significantly different in value from non-family firms.  
Columns [e] and [f] show similar results for founders, descendants, and hires in the role 
of chairman of the board and/or CEO. In fact, the multivariate results in Table X show that the 
founder effect is stronger for founder-chairman/CEOs than for founder-CEOs alone. The gain in 
Tobin’s q relative to non-family firms is 1.00 for founder-chairman/CEO firms (column [e]) 
compared to a 0.92 gain for founder-CEO firms (column [c]). The gain in q relative to other 
family firms is 1.08 for founder-chairman/CEO firms (column [f]) compared to a 0.84 gain for 
founder-CEO firms (column [d]). One likely explanation for this finding is in the nature of the 
skills that founders bring to their firms: Founders may be inspiring leaders, great visionaries, or 
exceptionally talented scientists. But they may not––and need not––be good managers as well. 
 Columns [g] through [j] of Table X show the effect of descendants by firm generation. 
The results in column [g] show that only second-generation descendant-CEO firms are 
significantly less valuable than are non-family firms. Third-generation descendant-CEO firms 
have a similar coefficient, but the t-statistic is not significant, perhaps due to the lower 
proportion of later generation family firms in our sample. Fourth-generation firms actually have 
a positive coefficient, which suggests that these firms are more valuable than non-family firms, 
but the coefficient is also not significant. Column [h] shows the incremental contribution to q of 
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each generation of descendant-led firms. The results show a non-monotonic effect of generation 
on firm value: Second-generation firms alone account for the negative effect of descendant-
CEOs. The marginal contribution of third-generation firms is nonsignificant. The marginal 
contribution of fourth-generation firms is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. 
Columns [i] and [j] show that the results for descendant-chairman/CEOs are consistent with 
those for descendant-CEOs, but are generally less significant.  
C. Agency Costs of Family and Non-Family Ownership  
Family firms offer a unique setting to test the impact of agency problems on the value of 
firm. Since the Berle and Means (1932) study, the public corporation has been characterized as a 
widely held firm that is subject to an agency problem between owners and managers (which we 
refer to as Agency Problem I). This view prevailed until Shleifer and Vishny (1986) called 
attention to a different ownership structure among publicly held corporations, a firm owned by 
one large shareholder (e.g., a family) and a fringe of small shareholders (Agency Problem II). In 
such a corporation, the classic agency problem is mitigated because of the large shareholder’s 
greater incentives to monitor the manager. However, a second type of agency problem appears: 
the large shareholder may use his or her controlling position in the firm to extract private benefits 
at the expense of minority shareholders.  
This second agency problem is particularly likely when the large shareholder is an 
individual or a family. If the large shareholder is an institution such as a bank, an investment 
fund, or a widely held corporation, the private benefits of control are diluted among several 
independent owners. As a result, the large shareholder’s incentives for expropriating minority 
shareholders (Agency Problem II) are small, but so are its incentives for monitoring the manager, 
so we revert to Agency Problem I for those firms. If the large shareholder is an individual or a 
family, it has greater incentives for both expropriation and monitoring, which are likely to lead 
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Agency Problem II to overshadow Agency Problem I. In fact, because large individual and 
family shareholders are frequently involved in management as well, Agency Problem I may be 
eliminated in these firms. 
But which of the two agency problems is more detrimental to shareholder value? We 
address this question by classifying our sample firms into four groups according to the presence 
or absence of each agency problem in each group, and by comparing the group average Tobin’s 
q’s. Although the actual presence of either agency problem in a firm is difficult to measure 
directly, in family firms we can at least measure the absence of Agency Problem I by assuming 
that having a family CEO eliminates the conflict between owners and managers.(The findings in 
Tables IX and X suggest that having a founder-chairman can also eliminate the agency conflict 
with managers, but the same is not true for a descendant-chairman.) Following La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Bebchuk et al. (2000), we use the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms such as 
dual share classes, pyramids, or cross-holdings in family firms as indicators of the family’s 
ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Any of these 
mechanisms can make the family’s controlling stake exceed its ownership stake. Therefore we 
can use these mechanisms as proxies for the divergence of interests between the family and other 
minority shareholders (Agency Problem II). 
We consider only dual or multiple share classes as a control-enhancing mechanism when 
they entail differential voting rights. We define pyramids as control structures in which the 
family holds its shares of the firm through one or more intermediate entities such as trusts, funds, 
foundations, limited partnerships, holdings or any other form of corporation of which the family 
owns less than 100 percent. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we define cross-holdings as control 
structures in which the firm owns shares in a corporation that belongs to the family’s chain of 
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control in the firm. Because the use of cross-holdings as a control-enhancing mechanism 
typically requires the existence of a pyramid, we combine these two mechanisms in our analyses. 
We also include voting agreements among shareholders as another type of control-
enhancing mechanism that enables corporate owners to control a greater fraction of the firm than 
what they own. Although the agreements themselves are seldom public, we do observe their 
outcome in proxy statements in the form of family members sharing voting power among 
themselves or with other shareholders. We only use voting agreements as a control-enhancing 
mechanism when they result in the family holding voting power over a larger number of shares 
than those they own with investment power.  
Table XI reports on the distribution of the different control-enhancing mechanisms in our 
sample. Under the least restrictive definition of a family firm, 50 percent of these firms use at 
least one of the three mechanisms described. Thirty-five percent use a single mechanism (ten 
percent multiple share classes, 22 percent pyramids/cross-holdings, and three percent voting 
agreements), and 15 percent use a combination of two or more. The use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms is particularly common among those firms that also qualify as family-owned under 
the most restrictive definition: Seventy-six percent of these firms use one or more mechanisms. 
As documented by many studies (e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1988; Zingales, 1995), multiple share classes are prevalent among large U.S. 
corporations: They are used by 23 percent of the Definition 1 family firms, and by 49 percent of 
the Definition 9 family firms. They are also common in non-family firms, although to a lesser 
extent (14 percent). We find that pyramids are equally or even more prevalent among Fortune 
500 family firms: They are used by 35 percent of the firms that fall under Definition 1, or by 45 
percent of those in Definition 9. Voting agreements are less prevalent than multiple share classes 
and pyramids, but still significant in economic terms: 10 percent under Definition 1, or 17 
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percent under Definition 9. More commonly than not, firms use this mechanism as a 
complement, rather than as a substitute, for the other two. 
We combine the presence or absence of control-enhancing mechanisms with the presence 
or absence of a family CEO to yield a useful two-by-two classification of our sample firms: 
• Type I: Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms (dual share classes, pyramids, 
cross-holdings, or voting agreements) and a family CEO. These firms might have Agency 
Problem II, but not Agency Problem I.  
• Type II: Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms but no family CEO. These firms 
might have both agency problems. 
• Type III: Family firms with a family CEO but no control-enhancing mechanisms. These 
firms do not have any of the two agency problems. 
• Type IV: Non-family firms, which may have Agency Problem I, but not Agency Problem II. 
We use this classification to test the impact on firm value of the two agency problems, 
either alone or in combination with each other, by comparing the average q of the four types of 
firms. Table XII reports the results of these tests. Using our first definition of Family Firm, there 
are 260 Type I family firms in our sample, 262 Type II family firms, 271 Type III family firms, 
and 1,767 non-family (Type IV) firms). There are also 248 family firms that, like the non-family 
firms, have neither control-enhancing mechanisms nor a family CEO.9 The similarity of the Type 
IV family firms to the non-family firms in the agency problems they face is reflected in a 
nonsignificant difference between their Tobin’s q’s. Therefore, in our subsequent analyses we 
                                                 
9 There are 242 out of the 1,767 non-family firm years that have multiple classes of shares with different voting 
rights. Because, in those firms, any private benefits of control appropriated by the largest shareholder (e.g. a bank, 
investment fund, or widely held corporation) would be diluted among several independent owners, we assume that 
there is no Agency Problem II.  
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group these family firms and the non-family firms together under Type IV. Although not 
reported, the results are similar if we exclude the family firms from the group.  
The strongest result that emerges from Table XII is that the absence of any agency 
problem is associated with the highest q among our sample firms, 2.66. The differences between 
this value and the mean q of the other three groups are all statistically significant. In other words, 
family firms whose CEO is a member of the family, and that have not put in place any control-
enhancing mechanisms (Type III firms), enjoy the highest performance, as measured by Tobin’s 
q. Family firms in which there is little room for an owner-manager conflict but where the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by large family shareholders is facilitated by control-
enhancing mechanisms (Type I family firms) have an average q of 1.93. Firms in which the only 
possible conflict of interest is that between owners and managers (non-family firms, or Type IV 
firms) have an average q of 1.97. Firms where there may be two agency problems (Type II 
family firms) have an average q of 1.94. Therefore, we find evidence that firm value is adversely 
affected by the presence of conflicts of interest, either between owners and managers, and/or 
between majority and minority shareholders.  
However, it is not clear that the existence of both agency problems is more detrimental to 
firm value than is the presence of either problem alone. The mean q of firms with both agency 
problems (1.94) is only slightly different from the mean q of firms with either Agency Problem I 
alone (1.97), or Agency Problem II alone (1.93). Conditional on firms being exposed to one of 
the two agency problems, a second problem does not carry any additional costs.  
Our results show that of the four types of firms we consider, those with the lowest value 
are family firms that have both control-enhancing mechanisms and a family CEO (Type I family 
firms). These firms exhibit a statistically significant discount in their Tobin’s q of 0.73 relative to 
family firms with a family CEO but no control-enhancing mechanisms (Type III family firms). 
 25
Family firms that have control-enhancing mechanisms but no family CEO (Type II family firms) 
also show a statistically significant discount in their Tobin’s q of 0.72 relative to Type III family 
firms. These findings suggest that the absence of a family member from the firm’s top 
management position curbs the family’s power to expropriate minority shareholders and 
therefore reduces the price that families pay for control. This interpretation is consistent with the 
finding that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, but 
decreases when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership.  
More generally, our results complement the finding of a “control premium” in earlier 
studies (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Zingales, 1995). The premium refers to the excess value 
of shares that confers on those shareholders special control rights relative to shares that are 
otherwise identical (e.g., in their cash-flow rights). Prior studies interpret this premium as a 
proxy for the private benefits of control that owners extract from the firm. However, estimates of 
the control premium do not provide a measure of the cost, if any, that the appropriation of such 
private benefits imposes on minority shareholders. In other words, the question of whether there 
is “expropriation” or “appropriation” remains open. The control premium literature typically 
assumes that private benefits come at the expense of minority shareholders (expropriation), but it 
is possible that the incentives provided by those benefits lead to higher value creation and that 
the benefits reflect a fair price for the large shareholders’ monitoring function in the firm 
(appropriation).  
Our results show that actual expropriation is occurring in these firms. Whenever families 
extract private benefits of control through their use of control-enhancing mechanisms and family 
officers and/or directors, they and the minority shareholders in the firms they control pay a price 
in the form of a discount in their value. In firms where there is a single class of shares, the cost of 
family control is spread among all shareholders (including the family) in proportion to their 
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ownership. If there are multiple share classes and the family's supervoting shares trade, or are 
valued, at a premium relative to the other class, minority shareholders pay a disproportionate 
share of the price for the family’s control. 
Next we compare the mean q’s of firms where we find each of the two agency problems 
in isolation from the other. This test speaks directly to the question of which of the two agency 
problems is more harmful to shareholder value. We find that the existence of a potential conflict 
of interest between controlling and minority shareholders hurts firm value more than does the 
classic owner-manager conflict. Although the difference (0.05) is not statistically significant, this 
result is consistent with our finding of a control discount. It also illuminates the theoretical 
debate about the relative importance of each agency problem (see, e.g., Burkart et al., 2003).  
D. Founder-CEO Benefits and Agency Costs 
 In Table XIII we examine how the beneficial effects of founder-CEOs interact with the 
agency costs of family control to yield premiums or discounts for family firms relative to non-
family firms. The first row reports univariate differences between family firms in the category 
indicated in each column heading, and for non-family (Type IV) firms. These results differ from 
the tests reported in Table XII only in that we further subdivide Types I and III into founder-
CEO and descendant-CEO categories. We do not subdivide the Type II family firms category 
because these firms have no family CEOs. Thus, in Table XIII the difference between their mean 
q and the mean q of Type IV firms is a nonsignificant -0.03, as reported also in Table XII.  
 Table XIII shows that Agency Problem I alone is significantly more costly than is 
Agency Problem II in founder-CEO firms (a 0.47 difference in q). Since the average q of Type 
IV firms is 1.97, this result implies that the mean q of Type I founder-CEO firms is 2.44. In these 
firms, the benefits brought about by their founders are great enough to offset the costs of family 
control. Nevertheless, there is a control discount in founder-CEO firms too. Type III founder-
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CEO firms, which differ from Type I firms in that they have no control-enhancing mechanisms 
in place, have a significantly larger q. Table XIII shows a premium of 1.45 for these firms 
relative to the Type IV firms, which implies a mean q of 3.42 for these firms.  
 For descendant-CEO firms, the relative costs of the two agency problems considered in 
isolation is the opposite. Descendant-CEO firms with control-enhancing mechanisms are 
significantly less valuable than are non-family firms in which ownership and management are 
separated. The discount of -0.22 implies a mean q of 1.75 for these firms. The absence of 
control-enhancing mechanisms does not significantly change the relative performance of these 
firms: The discount for Type III descendant-CEO relative to non family firms is -0.25, which is 
not significantly different from -0.22.  
The remaining rows in Table XIII report on the sensitivity of these results to the use of 
alternative econometric techniques. As before, to control for the selectivity bias we estimate 
multivariate regressions of q and industry-adjusted q, two-way fixed-effects and random-effects 
panel data models, and treatment effects models. We estimate the treatment effects regressions, 
using Heckman’s two-step procedure, as five separate regressions on subsamples that include 
only the family firms in the category indicated in each column heading, and the non-family 
firms. All models include the same control variables as the regressions in Tables V through VIII. 
Although not reported, the coefficients on these variables are similar to those reported in Tables 
V, VII, and VIII for the OLS, panel data, and Heckman models, respectively.  
 These analyses confirm the robustness of the univariate results. In fact, the differences 
are even more pronounced under most of the alternative econometric techniques we use, 
particularly after we control for the endogeneity of the different family firm categories. Unlike 
the models reported in Table VIII, here we see evidence of sample selectivity in the significance 
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of the selection parameter λ in three out of the five regressions. The selection makes the single-
stage results even stronger. 
III. Conclusion 
 Although family firms play a vital role in the world economy, this sector has received 
relatively little attention, partly because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable detailed data on 
these firms. We assemble a uniquely detailed panel data set on a sample of publicly traded U.S. 
firms that are in the Fortune 500 in at least one year during the period 1994–2000. Using this 
data, we examine the impact of family ownership, management, and control on firm value. We 
show that the prevalence and value premium (or discount) of family firms, relative to non-family 
firms, depends on how we incorporate these three elements into the definition of a family firm.  
We find that family ownership creates value only when it is combined with certain forms 
of family management and control. Family management adds value as long as the founder serves 
as the CEO of the family firm, or as its chairman with a non-family CEO. When descendants of 
the founder serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Family control in excess of ownership is 
often manifested in the form of multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, or voting 
agreements. In general, these mechanisms reduce shareholder value. In founder-CEO firms, the 
presence of control-enhancing mechanisms generates significant expropriation of non-family 
shareholders, as shown by a significant discount of 11 to 48 percent (depending on the estimation 
method) relative to founder-CEO firms without such mechanisms.  
However, despite expropriation, minority shareholders are likely to be better off in a 
family firm than they would be in a non-family firm. Founder-CEO firms with control-enhancing 
mechanisms are about 19 percent more valuable than non-family firms (averaging across 
estimation methods). Assuming, conservatively, that the value of the private benefits 
appropriated by the family averages ten percent of the value of family holdings, or 1.6 percent of 
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the value of the firm’s total equity (since family holdings average 16 percent), non-family 
shareholders are being expropriated of 1.9 percent of the value of their holdings (1.6 over 84).10 
Hence, the benefits to non-family shareholders brought about by founders are one order of 
magnitude higher than the costs of expropriation.  
In descendant-CEO firms, control-enhancing mechanisms enable family shareholders to 
appropriate, but not expropriate, private benefits. Nevertheless, the non-family shareholders in 
these firms are worse off than they would have been in a non-family firm. 
Our evidence sheds light on a longstanding question in corporate governance. We ask 
which of the two agency problems that minority shareholders can be exposed to is more 
damaging to firm value, the conflict of interest with managers or the conflict of interest with 
large controlling shareholders? We find that in the context of family firms, the answer to this 
question depends on whether founders or descendants serve as the CEO of their firms. Further 
research about the nature of the founder’s role in their firm may help us understand their unique 
contribution to firm value. 
 
                                                 
10 Prior estimates of the average control premium on tradable supervoting shares in the U.S. range between five 
percent (Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson, 1983) and 10.5 percent (Zingales, 1995). Because most of the 
supervoting shares in our sample are non-traded, our estimate of a ten percent control premium is conservative. 
 30
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, Renée B., Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira, 2004, Understanding the relationship 
between founder-CEOs and firm performance, working paper, New York University. 
Anderson, Ronald and David M. Reeb, 2003, Founding family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance 58, 1301–1329. 
Barclay, Michael J. and Clifford G. Holderness, 1989, Private benefits from control of public 
corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 371–395. 
Bebchuk, Lucien, Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, 2000, Stock pyramids, cross-
ownership, and dual class equity, in Randall K. Morck, ed.: Concentrated Corporate 
Ownership, University of Chigaco Press, Chicago, IL, 295–315. 
Berle, Adolph, and Gardiner Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
Harcourt, Brace, & World, New York, NY. 
Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer, 2003, Family firms, Journal of Finance 58, 
2167–2202. 
Chung, Kee H. and Stephen W. Pruitt, 1994, A simple approximation of Tobin’s q, Financial 
Management 23, 70–74. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2000, Separation of ownership from 
control of East Asian firms, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81–112. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2002, Disentangling 
the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings, Journal of Finance 57, 
2741–2772. 
Cronqvist, Henrik, and Mattias Nilsson, 2003, Agency costs of controlling minority 
shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 695–719. 
DeAngelo, Harry, and Linda DeAngelo, 1985, Managerial ownership of voting rights, Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 33–69. 
Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn, 1985, The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177. 
Demsetz, Harold, and Belén Villalonga, 2001, Ownership structure and corporate performance, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209–233. 
Faccio, Mara, and Larry H.P. Lang, 2002, The ultimate ownership of Western European 
corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365–395. 
Faccio, Mara, Larry H.P. Lang, and Leslie Young, 2001, Dividends and expropriation, American 
Economic Review 91, 54–78. 
 31
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2004, Founder-CEOs and stock market performance, working paper, 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107–155. 
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, 2004, Incentives vs. control: An Analysis of U.S. 
dual-class companies, NBER working paper 10240, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan, 1988, The role of majority shareholders in 
publicly held corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 317–346. 
Jarrell, Gregg A., and Annette B. Poulsen, 1988, Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover 
mechanisms: The recent evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 129–152. 
Jensen, Michael C., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, 
American Economic Review 76, 2, 323–329. 
Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López De Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership 
around the world, Journal of Finance 54, 471–517.  
Lease, Ronald C., John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson, 1983, The market value of 
control in publicly-traded corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 439–471. 
Lindenberg, Eric B. and Stephen A. Ross, 1981, Tobin’s q ratio and Industrial Organization, 
Journal of Business 54, 1, 1–32. 
Lins, Karl V., 2003, Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 38, 159–184. 
McConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595–612. 
Morck, Randall K., David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung, 2000, Inherited wealth, corporate 
control, and economic growth. The Canadian disease?, in Randall K. Morck, ed.: 
Concentrated Corporate Ownership, University of Chigaco Press, Chicago, IL, 319–369. 
Nenova, Tatiana, 2003, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country 
analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 325–351. 
Palia, Darius, and S. Abraham Ravid, 2002, The role of founders in large companies: 
Entrenchment or valuable human capital?, working paper, Rutgers University. 
Pérez-González, Francisco, 2001, Does inherited control hurt firm performance?, working paper, 
Columbia University. 
 32
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of 
Political Economy 94, 461–488. 
Smith, Brian F., and Ben Amoako-Adu, 1999, Management succession and financial 
performance of family controlled firms, Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 341–368. 
Villalonga, Belén, 2004, Does diversification cause the ‘diversification discount’?, Financial 
Management, forthcoming. 
Zingales, Luigi, 1995, What determines the value of corporate votes?, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1047–1073. 
 
 33
Table I 
  Variable Definitions 
 Variable  Description 
1 Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets. The firm’s market 
value is the value of common equity plus total assets minus the book value of common 
equity. For firms with one single class of stock, the market value of their common equity is 
the product of the share price at fiscal year end (per Compustat) times the number of shares 
outstanding (also per Compustat). For firms with multiple share classes, is the product of 
the share price at fiscal year end (per Compustat) times the total number of shares 
outstanding of all classes of shares––publicly tradable and non-tradable (per proxy 
statements). For firms with multiple share classes, this is equivalent to valuing the non-
tradable shares at the price of the publicly tradable shares. Sources: Compustat and Proxies.
2 Industry- 
adjusted q  
Difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed q’s of 
its segments, where a segment’s imputed q is the industry average q. Industry averages are 
computed at the most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of five single-
segment firms in the industry-year. Sources: Compustat and Proxies. 
3 Family 
ownership 
Ratio of the number of shares (of all classes) held by the family to total shares outstanding. 
The numerator includes all shares over which the family has either investment or voting 
power, or both, including family representatives (e.g. co-trustees, and family-designated 
directors). Includes all shares over which any family member has shared investment or 
voting power with a family member (which are only counted once), but none of the shares 
over which the investment or voting power is shared with a non-member of the family. 
Source: Proxies. 
4 Generation Latest generation of family members that are managers, directors, or block holders in the firm 
relative to the founder. Equals zero for non-family firms. Source: Proxies.  
5 Family vote-
holdings in 
excess of shares 
owned 
Ratio of the difference between the number of votes and the number of shares held by the 
family to the total votes outstanding. The numerator includes all shares and votes held by 
the family and family representatives (see [3]). The number of votes held by each family 
member/ representative is the product of the number of shares with voting power of each 
class, times the number of votes per share of that class. Source: Proxies. 
6 Governance 
index 
Number of governance provisions in the firm’s charter, bylaws, or SEC filings that reduce 
shareholder rights (Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) measure). Source: IRRC. 
7 Non-family 
blockholder 
ownership  
Ratio of the number of shares (of all classes) held by all non-family blockholders to the total 
shares outstanding. Blockholders are individuals or institutions listed in the proxy as 
beneficial owners of at least five percent of the firm. Source: Proxies. 
8 Non-family 
outside directors 
Number of non-family outside directors (i.e. directors that are not managers as well, either 
active or retired), divided by the total number of directors on the board. Source: Proxies. 
9 Market risk 
(beta) 
Estimate from market model in which the firm’s monthly returns over the past five years are 
regressed on the S&P500 monthly returns. Source: CRSP. 
10 Idiosyncratic risk Standard error of estimate from market model in which the firm’s monthly returns over the 
past five years are regressed on the S&P500 monthly returns. Source: CRSP. 
11 Diversification Equals one if the firm has two or more segments in different SIC codes, zero otherwise. 
Source: Compustat  
12 R&D / Sales Ratio of annual R&D expenditures to sales. Variable is set to zero when R&D information is 
missing. Source: Compustat. 
13 CAPX / PPE Ratio of capital expenditures to property, plant and equipment. Source: Compustat. 
14 Dividends/ 
Equity 
Ratio of dollar value of dividends on common stock to the book value of common stock. 
Source: Compustat.  
15 Debt / Equity Ratio of total debt to the market value of publicly traded common equity. Source: Compustat. 
16 Firm age Difference between the year of observation and the firm’s founding year. Source: Compustat. 
17 Employees Total number of employees. Source: Compustat. 
18 Sales Total sales ($ Million). Source: Compustat. 
19 Sales growth Arithmetic average of firm’s sales growth rate over the past three years. Source: Compustat. 
20 ROA Ratio of operating income after depreciation to total assets. Source: Compustat. 
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Table II 
 Prevalence and Value of Family and Non-Family Firms under Different Definitions of a Family Firm 
Tobin’s q is computed using Compustat data for both share price (at fiscal year end) and total shares outstanding for companies with one single class of stock. For 
firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total shares outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). This is equivalent to 
valuing the non-tradable shares at the price of the publicly traded shares. Definitions are listed in approximately increasing order of restrictiveness: Definition 1 
is the least restrictive, definition 10 is the most restrictive. The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock 
markets during 1994-2000. t-statistics are from two-sided t-tests of difference in means; z-statistics are from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of difference in medians. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
  Mean q  Median q 
 
Definition 
[a] 
 Proportion 
of Family 
     Firms
         [b] 
Family 
Firms
    [c] 
Non-
Family 
Firms
    [d] 
 
Difference
   [c] – [d]
   [e] 
 
t-stat 
 
     [f] 
 
Family 
Firms
    [g] 
Non-
Family 
Firms
    [h] 
 
Difference
   [g] – [h]
   [i] 
 
t-stat 
 
     [j] 
 
1. Family has any shares  37% 2.17 1.95 0.23 (3.64) *** 1.65 1.50 0.15 (4.66) *** 
2. Family has any shares, and has family officers and family 
directors 26% 2.24 1.96 0.28 (4.00) *** 1.60 1.54 0.06 (1.96) ** 
3. Family is largest voteholder  20% 2.23 1.98 0.25 (3.37) *** 1.66 1.53 0.13 (2.40) *** 
4. Family is largest shareholder 19% 2.27 1.98 0.29 (3.77) *** 1.67 1.53 0.14 (2.63) *** 
5. Family has any shares, and is in second or later generation 19% 1.89 2.06 -0.17 (-2.23) ** 1.63 1.53 0.09 (2.52) ** 
6. Family is largest voteholder, and has family officers and 
family directors  14% 2.31 1.98 0.33 (3.86) *** 1.58 1.55 0.03 (0.71)  
7. Family is largest shareholder and has at least 20% of the votes 12% 2.19 2.01 0.18 (1.96) ** 1.66 1.54 0.12 (2.02) ** 
8. Family has any shares, and has family directors but no family 
officers  8% 1.94 2.04 -0.10 (-0.94)  1.66 1.54 0.12 (2.22) ** 
9. Family is largest voteholder, has at least 20% of the votes and 
has family officers and family directors, and is in second or 
later generation  7% 1.82 2.05 -0.23 (-1.96) ** 1.57 1.55 0.01 (0.24)  
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Table III 
Summary Statistics for Family and Non-Family Firms under Alternative Definitions 
The top number in each cell is the mean, the bottom number is either the standard deviation (in italics) or the t-
statistic (in parentheses). Family firms are defined as those where the family has any shares (least restrictive 
definition) or as those where the family is the largest voteholder, has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers 
and family directors, and is in second or later generation (most restrictive definition). The sample comprises 2,808 
firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
    Least Restrictive Definition  Most Restrictive Definition 
      [a] 
     All  
    Firms 
     [b] 
     Family
     Firms
[c] 
Non-Family 
Firms 
[d] 
Difference 
([b] – [c]) 
       [e] 
Family 
Firms 
[f] 
Non-Family 
Firms 
[g] 
Difference 
  ([e] – [f]) 
Tobin’s q  2.03 2.17 1.95 0.23 *** 1.82 2.05 -0.23 ** 
 1.60 1.83 1.44 (3.64)  0.85 1.65 (-1.96)  
Industry-adjusted q  -0.32 -0.07 -0.47 0.40 *** -0.38 -0.31 -0.07  
 1.43 1.59 1.29 (7.32)  1.09 1.45 -(0.67)  
Family ownership 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.16 *** 0.28 0.04 0.24 ***
 0.14 0.18 0.00 (37.76)  0.20 0.11 (27.10)  
Generation 0.77 2.07 0.00 2.07 *** 2.63 0.62 2.01 ***
 1.19 1.06 0.00 (82.07)  0.71 1.09 (25.96)  
0.27 0.50 0.13 0.37 *** 0.76 0.23 0.53 ***Control-enhancing 
mechanisms 0.44 0.50 0.34 (23.30)  0.43 0.42 (17.27)  
0.06 0.17 0.00 0.17 *** 0.56 0.02 0.54 ***Family voteholdings in 
excess of shares owned 0.48 0.78 0.00 (9.25)  1.33 0.30 (16.11)  
Governance index 9.66 9.05 10.02 -0.97 *** 8.55 9.74 -1.19 ***
 2.73 2.70 2.68 (-9.22)  2.91 2.69 (-6.07)  
0.19 0.16 0.21 -0.05 *** 0.11 0.20 -0.09 ***Non-family blockholder 
ownership 0.24 0.22 0.25 (-5.11)  0.20 0.24 (-5.14)  
0.74 0.66 0.79 -0.14 *** 0.60 0.75 -0.15 ***Proportion of non-family 
outside directors 0.20 0.19 0.19 (-18.64)  0.19 0.19 (-10.64)  
Market risk (beta) 1.05 1.10 1.02 0.08 *** 1.00 1.05 -0.05 * 
 0.41 0.42 0.39 (4.92)  0.36 0.41 (-1.74)  
Idiosyncratic risk 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.04 *** 0.26 0.28 -0.02  
 0.19 0.24 0.16 (5.26)  0.18 0.19 (-1.51)  
Diversification 0.56 0.50 0.60 -0.09 *** 0.56 0.56 0.00  
 0.50 0.50 0.49 (-4.85)  0.50 0.50 (0.02)  
R&D / Sales 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 *** 0.01 0.02 -0.01 ***
 0.04 0.04 0.04 (-4.85)  0.02 0.04 (-5.10)  
CAPX / PPE 0.23 0.26 0.22 0.04 *** 0.26 0.23 0.02  
 0.22 0.32 0.14 (4.20)  0.23 0.22 (1.40)  
0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.03 *** 0.06 0.06 -0.01  Dividends / Book value 
of equity 0.28 0.13 0.34 (-2.47)  0.07 0.29 (-0.28)  
0.46 0.38 0.51 -0.13 *** 0.44 0.46 -0.02  Debt / Market value of 
equity 0.99 0.81 1.08 (-3.31)  0.70 1.01 (-0.30)  
Assets ($Millions) 9,510 8,080 10,352 -2,271 *** 12,212 9,296 2,917 * 
 21,816 22,855 21,141 (-2.67) 46,443 18,520 (1.85)
Firm age  69.93 62.68 74.19 -11.51 *** 79.61 69.16 10.45 ***
 41.71 39.17 42.57 (-7.13)  29.84 42.42 (3.47)  
Employees 43,190 39,695 45,240 -5,545 * 36,233 43,737 -7,503  
 72,799 83,417 65,718 (-1.94)  66,336 73,267 (-1.41)  
Sales ($ Millions) 9,272 8,196 9,906 -1,711 *** 8,793 9,310 -517  
 16,696 17,159 16,389 (-2.63) 26,700 15,641 (-0.43)  
Sales growth 15.9% 19.6% 13.8% 5.9% ** 8.8% 16.5% -7.7% * 
 61.0% 69.5% 55.2% (-2.47)  19.3% 63.1% (-1.75)  
ROA 11.1% 11.6% 10.9% 0.7% ** 10.8% 11.2% -0.3%  
 6.9% 6.8% 6.9% (-2.62)  5.1% 7.0% (-0.70)  
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Table IV  
Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry 
Number and percent of firm-year observations by primary two-digit SIC code. Family firms are defined as those 
where the family has any shares (least restrictive definition) or as those where the family is the largest voteholder, 
has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers and family directors, and is in second or later generation (most 
restrictive definition). The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. 
stock markets during 1994-2000. 
   Least Restrictive Definition  Most Restrictive Definition 
SIC 
Code 
Industry Description All 
Firms 
Family 
Firms 
Non-
Family 
Firms
% Family 
Firms in 
Industry
Family 
Firms 
Non-
Family 
Firms
% Family 
Firms in 
Industry
 1 Agricultural Production--Crops 14 7 7 50% 0 14 0%
 7 Agricultural Services 3 0 3 0% 0 3 0%
10 Metal Mining 5 0 5 0% 0 5 0%
13 Field Crops, except Cash Grains 64 4 60 6% 0 64 0%
15 General Building Contractors 44 29 15 66% 0 44 0%
16 Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 14 7 7 50% 0 14 0%
17 Special Trade Contractors 3 0 3 0% 0 3 0%
20 Food And Kindred Products 171 72 99 42% 17 154 10%
21 Tobacco Products 8 0 8 0% 0 8 0%
22 Textile Mill Products 26 19 7 73% 7 19 27%
23 Apparel And Other Textile Products 28 28 0 100% 0 28 0%
24 Lumber And Wood Products 21 7 14 33% 1 20 5%
25 Furniture And Fixtures 35 10 25 29% 10 25 29%
26 Paper And Allied Products 85 33 52 39% 3 82 4%
27 Printing And Publishing 89 82 7 92% 35 54 39%
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 267 37 230 14% 10 257 4%
29 Petroleum And Coal Products 92 27 65 29% 12 80 13%
30 Rubber And Misc. Plastics Products 53 25 28 47% 5 48 9%
32 Stone, Clay, And Glass Products 18 0 18 0% 0 18 0%
33 Primary Metal Industries 88 29 59 33% 2 86 2%
34 Fabricated Metal Products 54 0 54 0% 0 54 0%
35 Industrial Machinery And Equipment 220 70 150 32% 14 206 6%
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 139 65 74 47% 5 134 4%
37 Transportation Equipment 167 46 121 28% 11 156 7%
38 Instruments And Related Products 98 30 68 31% 0 98 0%
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 14 7 7 50% 3 11 21%
40 Railroad Transportation 32 0 32 0% 0 32 0%
42 Trucking And Warehousing 18 7 11 39% 0 18 0%
44 Water Transportation 9 6 3 67% 6 3 67%
45 Transportation By Air 48 10 38 21% 0 48 0%
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 4 0 4 0% 0 4 0%
47 Transportation Services 7 0 7 0% 0 7 0%
48 Communication 117 50 67 43% 7 110 6%
50 Wholesale Trade--Durable Goods 70 34 36 49% 7 63 10%
51 Wholesale Trade--Nondurable Goods 86 31 55 36% 1 85 1%
52 Building Materials & Garden Supplies 30 10 20 33% 3 27 10%
53 General Merchandise Stores 93 31 62 33% 7 86 8%
54 Food Stores 66 36 30 55% 12 54 18%
55 Automotive Dealers & Service Stations 22 17 5 77% 0 22 0%
56 Apparel And Accessory Stores 33 24 9 73% 5 28 15%
57 Furniture And Homefurnishings Stores 25 14 11 56% 2 23 8%
58 Eating And Drinking Places 11 0 11 0% 0 11 0%
59 Miscellaneous Retail 72 47 25 65% 8 64 11%
60 Depository Institutions 6 0 6 0% 0 6 0%
70 Hotels And Other Lodging Places 17 9 8 53% 6 11 35%
72 Personal Services 21 14 7 67% 0 21 0%
73 Business Services 119 35 84 29% 7 112 6%
75 Auto Repair, Services, And Parking 15 0 15 0% 0 15 0%
78 Motion Pictures 13 10 3 77% 0 13 0%
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 17 3 14 18% 0 17 0%
80 Health Services 25 14 11 56% 0 25 0%
87 Engineering & Management Services 7 0 7 0% 0 7 0%
99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 5 5 0 100% 0 5 0%
 Total 2,808 1,041 1,767 37% 206 2,602 7%
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Table V 
OLS Regressions of Firm Value on a Family Firm Dummy 
This table reports multivariate, pooled OLS regressions of Tobin’s q or industry-adjusted q on family ownership. 
Family ownership is measured by a dummy indicating whether the family has any shares (least restrictive definition) 
or a dummy indicating whether the family is the largest voteholder, has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers 
and family directors, and is in second or later generation (most restrictive definition). Tobin’s q is measured as the 
ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total shares outstanding 
for companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total 
shares outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). Industry-adjusted q is the difference 
between the firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed q’s of its segments, where a segment’s imputed 
q is the industry average q, and q is measured as the ratio of market value to assets. Industry averages are computed 
at the most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of five single-segment firms in the industry-year. The 
unadjusted Tobin’s q regressions include year dummies for all sample years except 1994, and 52 industry dummies 
for all two-digit SIC codes in the sample except SIC code no. 1. The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year observations 
from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-
consistent (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 Least Restrictive Definition Most Restrictive Definition
 Dependent 
Variable: 
Tobin’s q 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Industry-
adjusted q 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Tobin’s q 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Industry-
adjusted q 
0.20 *** 0.33 *** -0.23 *** -0.10   Family firm (dummy) 
(2.97)  (5.67)  (-3.29)  (-1.28)  
-0.03 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** Governance index 
(-3.20)  (-4.49)  (-3.90)  (-5.27)  
-0.56) *** -0.44 *** -0.64 *** -0.54 *** Non-family blockholder ownership 
(-4.87)  (-3.48)  (-5.07)  (-3.68)  
0.07   0.13   -0.11   -0.12   Proportion of non-family outside directors 
(0.58)  (1.25)  (-0.94)  (-1.08)  
0.19 *** 0.08   0.20 *** 0.11   Market risk (beta) 
(2.61)  (1.22)  (2.79)  (1.56)  
-0.37 *** -0.31 *** -0.37 *** -0.32 *** Diversification 
(-6.37)  (-6.13)  (-6.43)  (-6.21)  
14.87 *** 3.64 *** 14.73 *** 3.17 ** R&D / Sales 
(7.74)  (2.91)  (7.64)  (2.53)  
0.67 * 0.51 * 0.69 * 0.54 * CAPX / PPE 
(1.73)  (1.68)  (1.74)  (1.75)  
0.23   0.27   0.21   0.26   Dividends / Book value of equity 
(1.26)  (1.53)  (1.21)  (1.45)  
-0.23 *** -0.22 *** -0.23 *** -0.23 *** Debt / Market value of equity 
(-3.38)  (-3.64)  (-3.39)  (-3.64)  
0.05 * 0.09 *** 0.04   0.07 *** Ln (assets) 
(1.86)  (3.86)  (1.45)  (3.17)  
-0.04   -0.08 ** -0.03   -0.08 ** Ln (age) 
(-1.01)  (-2.47)  (-0.79)  (-2.41)  
1.40 *** -0.49 * 1.70 *** 0.04   Intercept 
 (3.61)  (-1.76)  (4.46)  (0.14)  
Adjusted R2 0.35  0.12  0.34  0.11  
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Table VI 
OLS Regressions of Firm Value on Family Ownership and Excess Voteholdings 
This table reports pooled OLS regressions of Tobin’s q or industry-adjusted q on various measures of family 
ownership, control, and management. Family firms are defined as those where the family has any shares. Tobin’s q 
is measured as the ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total 
shares outstanding for companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are 
used for total shares outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). Industry-adjusted q is the 
difference between the firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed q’s of its segments, where a 
segment’s imputed q is the industry average q, and q is measured as the ratio of market value to assets. Industry 
averages are computed at the most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of five single-segment firms in 
the industry-year. The unadjusted Tobin’s q regressions include year dummies for all sample years except 1994, and 
52 industry dummies for all two-digit SIC codes in the sample except SIC code no. 1. The sample comprises 2,808 
firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. t-statistics from 
heteroskedasticity-consistent (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 Dep. Variable: Tobin’s q  Dep. Var.: Industry-adjusted q 
0.80 *** 1.71 *** 0.92 *** 2.23 *** Family ownership 
(3.48)  (2.83)  (4.18)  (4.17)  
  -1.72 **   -2.52 *** (Family ownership)2 
  (-1.99)    (-3.40)  
-0.16 *** -0.13 *** -0.15 *** -0.10 ** Family excess voteholdings  
(-3.90)  (-2.98)  (-4.24)  (-2.58)  
-0.03 *** -0.03 ** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** Governance index 
(-2.66)  (-2.56)  (-4.08)  (-3.84)  
-0.54 *** -0.53 *** -0.44 *** -0.43 *** Non-family blockholder ownership 
(-4.77)  (-4.73)  (-3.43)  (-3.43)  
0.02   0.04   0.02   0.06   Proportion of non-family outside directors 
(0.13)  (0.30)  (0.14)  (0.50)  
0.19 *** 0.20 *** 0.10   0.10   Market risk (beta) 
(2.65)  (2.73)  (1.43)  (1.43)  
-0.38 *** -0.38 *** -0.32 *** -0.31 *** Diversification 
(-6.47)  (-6.47)  (-6.22)  (-6.20)  
14.93 *** 14.88 *** 3.48 *** 3.57 *** R&D / Sales 
(7.78)  (7.77)  (2.79)  (2.87)  
0.68 * 0.67 * 0.54 * 0.51 * CAPX / PPE 
(1.83)  (1.79)  (1.83)  (1.72)  
0.21   0.22   0.25   0.26   Dividends / Book value of equity 
(1.24)  (1.26)  (1.48)  (1.50)  
-0.23 *** -0.23 *** -0.23 *** -0.23 *** Debt / Market value of equity 
(-3.40)  (-3.40)  (-3.69)  (-3.70)  
0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** Ln (assets) 
(2.19)  (2.28)  (3.88)  (4.13)  
-0.04   -0.05   -0.09 *** -0.09 *** Ln (age) 
(-1.11)  (-1.18)  (-2.65)  (-2.76)  
1.27 *** 1.20 *** -0.34   -0.46   Intercept 
 (3.17)  (2.94)  (-1.20)  (-1.59)  
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.35 0.12  0.12
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Table VII 
Fixed and Random Effects Regressions of Firm Value on a Family Firm Dummy 
This table reports fixed- and random-effects regressions of Tobin’s q on family ownership. Family ownership is 
measured by a dummy indicating whether the family has any shares (least restrictive definition) or a dummy 
indicating whether the family is the largest voteholder, has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers and family 
directors, and is in second or later generation (most restrictive definition). Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the 
firm’s market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total shares outstanding for 
companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total shares 
outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). All regressions include year dummies for all 
sample years except 1994. The random effects regressions also include 52 industry dummies for all two-digit SIC 
codes in the sample except SIC code no. 1. The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-
500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-consistent 
(Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), or 10% (*) level. 
 Least Restrictive Definition Most Restrictive Definition
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects 
0.13   0.20 ** -0.08   -0.12   Family firm (dummy) 
(0.71)  (2.14)  (-0.45)  (-0.91)  
0.00   -0.03 * 0.00   -0.03 ** Governance index 
(-0.09)  (-1.83)  (-0.08)  (-2.07)  
-0.44 *** -0.44 *** -0.44 *** -0.46 *** Non-family blockholder ownership 
(-3.68)  (-4.02)  (-3.70)  (-4.25)  
0.51 * 0.20   0.48 * 0.09   Proportion of non-family outside directors 
(1.94)  (1.08)  (1.84)  (0.49)  
0.46 *** 0.41 *** 0.46 *** 0.41 *** Market risk (beta) 
(4.79)  (5.04)  (4.800  (5.16)  
-0.05   -0.14 ** -0.05   -0.14 ** Diversification 
(-0.74)  (-2.34)  (-0.74)  (-2.37)  
3.17 ** 9.02 *** 3.14 ** 8.96 *** R&D / Sales 
(2.05)  (8.04)  (2.03)  (7.97)  
0.18 * 0.26 *** 0.18 * 0.27 *** CAPX / PPE 
(1.76)  (2.62)  (1.77)  (2.65)  
0.03   0.07   0.03   0.07   Dividends / Book value of equity 
(0.47)  (1.04)  (0.47)  (1.01)  
-0.11 *** -0.14 *** -0.11 *** -0.14 *** Debt / Market value of equity 
(-4.75)  (-6.05)  (-4.73)  (-6.05)  
0.29 *** 0.14 *** 0.29 *** 0.14 *** Ln (assets) 
(4.62)  (3.69)  (4.68)  (3.57)  
-0.42 * -0.08   -0.44 * -0.08   Ln (age) 
(-1.85)  (-1.29)  (-1.95)  (-1.28)  
0.12   0.25   0.25   0.47   Intercept 
 (0.12)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (0.60)   
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.34 0.10  0.32
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Table VIII 
Selectivity-Corrected Effect of Family Ownership and Control on Firm Value  
This table reports treatment effect (Heckman) regressions of Tobin’s q on family ownership, control, and 
management. Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets. Family ownership is 
measured by a dummy indicating whether the family has any shares (least restrictive definition) or a dummy 
indicating whether the family is the largest voteholder, has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers and family 
directors, and is in second or later generation (most restrictive definition). Control-enhancing mechanisms include 
multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, and voting agreements. The governance index is the number of 
charter provisions that reduce shareholder rights. All regressions include year dummies for all sample years except 
1994, and 37 industry dummies for all two-digit SIC codes in the sample except SIC code no. 1 and 15 additional 
industries that completely determined family ownership in the probit model. The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year 
observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. t-statistics from 
heteroskedasticity-consistent (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 Least Restrictive Definition Most Restrictive Definition
 First Stage 
(Probit) 
Dependent 
(Treatment) 
Variable: 
Family Firm 
Second Stage 
Dependent 
(Outcome) 
Variable: q 
First Stage 
(Probit) 
Dependent 
(Treatment) 
Variable: 
Family Firm 
Second Stage 
Dependent 
(Outcome) 
Variable: q 
 0.78 **   -0.26  Family firm (dummy) 
 (2.08)    (-0.94)  
-0.06 *** -0.02   -0.08 *** -0.04 *** Governance index 
(-5.29)  (-1.65)  (-4.50)  (-3.67)  
-1.11 *** -0.42 *** -1.91 *** -0.64 *** Non-family blockholder ownership 
(-7.70)  (-3.06)  (-6.82)  (-5.54)  
-2.05 *** 0.44   -1.69 *** -0.11   Proportion of non-family outside directors 
(-13.95)  (1.59)  (-7.82)  (-0.79)  
0.28 *** 0.14 * 0.02   0.21 *** Market risk (beta) 
(3.27)  (1.78)  (0.15)  (2.83)  
-0.07   -0.36 *** 0.00   -0.38 *** Diversification 
(-1.09)  (-5.97)  (-0.040  (-6.51)  
-1.33   15.11 *** -6.52 ** 14.76 *** R&D / Sales 
(-1.43)  (17.99)  (-2.32)  (17.86)  
0.14   0.65 *** 2.40 *** 0.69 *** CAPX / PPE 
(0.75)  (5.22)  (5.44)  (5.67)  
-0.53 ** 0.26 *** -0.66   0.21 ** Dividends / Book value of equity 
(-2.27)  (2.81)  (-1.06)  (2.38)  
-0.07 * -0.22 *** 0.11 *** -0.23 *** Debt / Market value of equity 
(-1.86)  (-7.66)  (2.93)  (-8.34)  
-0.10 *** 0.06 ** -0.29 *** 0.04   Ln (assets) 
(-3.33)  (2.22)  (-5.70)  (1.32)  
-0.13    -0.39    Idiosyncratic risk 
 (-0.65)   (-1.27)   
-0.08 *  0.73 ***  Ln (age) 
(-1.91)   (6.77)   
3.11 *** 0.51  7.35 *** 1.60 *** Intercept 
 (6.23)  (0.79)  (11.45)  (3.72)  
 -0.35    0.01  Lambda 
 (-1.58)    (0.04)  
Pseudo R2 0.27    0.36    
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Table IX 
Prevalence and Value Effect of Founders and Descendants as Chairman or CEO 
This table reports on the distribution of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board between 
family firm founders, descendants, and hired individuals in family firms, and on its effect on firm value. The top 
number in each cell is the mean Tobin’s q, the bottom number is the number of firms in each group (in square 
brackets). Family firms are defined as those where the family has any shares. Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of 
the firm’s market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total shares outstanding for 
companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total shares 
outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). The subsample in this table comprises 1,041 
family firm-year observations from ** Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000.  
 Founder-CEO Descendant-CEO Hire-CEO Total 
Founder-Chairman of the Board 3.12 1.61 2.81 3.00 
 [215] [10] [73] [298] 
Descendant-Chairman of the Board - 1.74 1.81 1.76 
 [0] [306] [78] [384] 
Hire-Chairman of the Board - - 1.94 1.94 
 [0] [0] [359] [359] 
Total 3.12 1.74 2.04 2.17 
 [215] [316] [510] [1,041] 
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Table X 
Multivariate Regressions of Firm Value on Family Firm Generation, and on Founders/Descendants as Chairman/CEO 
This table reports regression coefficient on family firm dummy variables from multivariate OLS regressions of Tobin’s q on those dummies and several control 
variables. The family firm dummies take on a value of one only for the family firms in the category indicated in each column heading. Family firms are defined 
as those where the family has any shares. Generation refers to the latest generation of family members that are active in the firm as managers, directors, or block 
holders, relative to the founder. Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the firm’s market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total 
shares outstanding for companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total shares outstanding of all 
classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). All regressions include the following control variables: Governance index (number of charter provisions that 
reduce shareholder rights), Non-family blockholder ownership, Proportion of non-family outside directors, Market risk (beta), Diversification, R&D / Sales, 
CAPX / PPE, Dividends / Book value of equity, Debt / Market value of equity, Log of assets, Log of age, year dummies for all sample years except 1994, and 52 
industry dummies for all two-digit SIC codes in the sample except SIC code no. 1. The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 
firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-consistent (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level 
  Latest Active 
Generation 
Founder-CEO vs. 
Descendant-CEO
Founder-CB/CEO vs.
Descendant-CB/CEO
Founder-CEO vs. 
Descendant-CEO by 
Generation 
Founder-CB/CEO vs.
Descendant-CB/CEO 
by Generation 
 Relative 
to Non-
Family 
Firms 
[a] 
Relative 
to Earlier 
Generation 
Family Firms
[b] 
Relative 
to Non-
Family 
Firms 
[c] 
Relative 
to Other 
Family 
Firms 
[d] 
Relative 
to Non-
Family 
Firms 
[e] 
Relative 
to Other 
Family 
Firms 
[f] 
Relative 
to Non-
Family 
Firms 
[g] 
Relative 
to Earlier 
Generation 
Family Firms
[h] 
Relative
to Non-
Family 
Firms 
[i] 
Relative 
to Earlier 
Generation 
Family Firms
[j] 
Founder-CEO or CB/CEO      0.92 *** 0.84 *** 1.00 *** 1.08 *** 0.92 ***  1.00 ***  
     (5.11)  (4.51)  (6.34)  (6.75)  (5.08)   (6.34)   
Descendant-CEO or CB/CEO      -0.17 ** -0.25 *** -0.11 * -0.03          
     (-2.39)  (-3.06)  (-1.69)  (-0.36)          
Hire-CEO or CB/CEO     0.05    -0.09    0.05   -0.09   
     (0.69)    (-1.35)    (0.68)   (-1.37)   
First Generation 0.76 ***                  
 (5.37)                   
Second Generation -0.06  -0.83 ***         -0.19 ***  -0.07   
 (-1.11)  (-5.83)          (-2.61)   (-0.94)   
Third Generation -0.06  -0.01          -0.21  -0.02  -0.22 * -0.15  
 (-0.66)  (-0.06)          (-1.41)  (0.16)  (-1.82)  (-1.17)  
Fourth Generation -0.14  -0.08          0.14  0.35 * -0.03  0.19  
 (-1.58) (-0.81)          (0.87)  (1.73)  (-0.22)  (1.26)  
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Table XI 
Use of Control-Enhancing Mechanisms by Family Firms 
Multiple share classes are voting structures where the firm has issued two or more classes of stock with differential 
voting rights. Pyramids are control structures where the family holds its shares of the firm through one or more 
intermediate entities such as trusts, funds, foundations, limited partnerships, holdings or any other form of 
corporation of which the family owns less than 100%. Cross-holdings are control structures where the firm owns 
shares in a corporation that belongs to the family’s chain of control in the firm. Voting agreements are pacts among 
shareholders that result in the family holding voting power over a larger number of shares than what it owns with 
investment power. Family firms are defined as those where the family has any shares (least restrictive definition) or 
as those where the family is the largest voteholder, has at least 20% of the votes, has family officers and/or family 
directors, and is in second or later generation (most restrictive definition). The subsample in this table comprises 
1,041 family firm-year observations from *** Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. 
 Least Restrictive Definition Most Restrictive Definition
 
Family 
CEO
Hired 
CEO Total
% of 
Total
Family 
CEO 
Hired 
CEO Total
% of 
Total
Multiple share classes w/ different voting rights (only) 55 48 103 10% 34 13 47 23%
Pyramids and Cross-Holdings (only) 93 134 227 22% 32 15 47 23%
Voting agreements (only) 22 7 29 3% 6 0 6 3%
Multiple share classes and Pyramids/Cross-Holdings 45 39 84 8% 18 9 27 13%
Multiple share classes and Voting agreements 7 18 25 2% 6 5 11 5%
Pyramids/Cross-Holdings and Voting agreements 16 8 24 2% 2 0 2 1%
Multiple share classes, Pyramids/Cross-Holdings and  
     Voting agreements 21 8 29 3% 10 6 16 8%
Total Multiple share classes 128 113 241 23% 68 33 101 49%
Total Pyramids and Cross-Holdings 175 189 364 35% 62 30 92 45%
Total Voting agreements 66 41 107 10% 24 11 35 17%
No control-enhancing mechanisms 272 248 520 50% 31 19 50 24%
Total 531 510 1,041 100% 139 67 206 100%
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Table XII 
Impact of Agency Problems on Firm Value 
The top number in each cell is the mean Tobin’s q, the bottom number is either the number of firms of each 
type (in square brackets) or the t-statistic (in parentheses). Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the firm’s 
market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total shares outstanding for 
companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total 
shares outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). This is equivalent to valuing the 
non-tradable shares at the price of the publicly traded shares. The presence of Agency Problem I is measured 
by the presence of a family-CEO in the firm. The presence of Agency Problem II is measured by the use of 
control-enhancing mechanisms including multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, and voting 
agreements. The sample comprises 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. 
stock markets during 1994-2000. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% 
(*) level. 
Conflict of Interest Between Ownership and Management  
(Agency Problem I) 
 
No Yes 
 
t-tests 
Type I Family Firms Type II Family Firms (I) – (II) 
1.93 1.94 -0.01 
 
Yes 
 [260] [262] (-0.13) 
Type III Family Firms Type IV (Non-Family) Firms (III) – (IV) 
2.66 1.97 0.69*** 
 
Conflict of Interest 
Between Large and 
Minority Shareholders 
(Agency Problem II)  
No 
[271] [2,015] (6.33) 
(I) – (III) (II) – (IV) (I) – (IV) 
-0.73*** -0.03 -0.05 
 
t -tests 
(-3.96) (-0.35) (-0.48) 
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Table XIII 
Founder-CEO Benefits and Agency Costs 
This table reports regression coefficients on family firm dummy variables from different regressions of Tobin’s q on 
those dummies and several control variables. The family firm dummies take on a value of one only for the family 
firms in the category indicated in each column heading. Type I family firms have a family-CEO (founder or 
descendant) and control-enhancing mechanisms such as multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, and voting 
agreements. Type II family firms have control-enhancing mechanisms but no family-CEO. Type III family firms 
have a family-CEO but no control-enhancing mechanisms. Family firms that have a non-family-CEO and no 
control-enhancing mechanisms are included with non-family firms in the Type IV category. The dependent variable 
in all regressions is Tobin’s q, except in the industry-adjusted q model. Tobin’s q is measured as the ratio of the 
firm’s market value to total assets, using Compustat data for both share price and total shares outstanding for 
companies with one single class of stock. For firms with multiple share classes, proxy data are used for total shares 
outstanding of all classes of shares (publicly traded and non-tradable). Industry-adjusted q is the difference between 
the firm’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed q’s of its segments, where a segment’s imputed q is the 
industry average q, and q is measured as the ratio of market value to assets. Industry averages are computed at the 
most precise SIC level for which there is a minimum of five single-segment firms in the industry-year. All 
regressions except for the univariate OLS model include the following control variables: Governance index (number 
of charter provisions that reduce shareholder rights), Non-family blockholder ownership, Proportion of non-family 
outside directors, Market risk (beta), Diversification, R&D / Sales, CAPX / PPE, Dividends / Book value of equity, 
Debt / Market value of equity, Log of assets, and Log of age. All regressions except for the univariate OLS model 
and the industry-adjusted q model also include year dummies for all sample years except 1994. The multivariate 
OLS regression and the random effects regression also include 52 industry dummies for all two-digit SIC codes in 
the sample except SIC code no. 1. The treatment effects regressions are estimated, using Heckman’s two-step 
procedure, as five separate regressions on subsamples that include only the family firms in the category indicated in 
each column heading, and the 2,015 Type IV (non-family) firms. The first-stage probit model includes all variables 
listed above as well as Idiosyncratic risk, and excludes the industry dummies that completely determine family 
ownership for its category. The second-stage equation excludes Idiosyncratic risk and Log of age. The full sample 
comprises 2,808 firm-year observations from 508 Fortune-500 firms listed in U.S. stock markets during 1994-2000. 
t-statistics from heteroskedasticity-consistent (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 Type I Family Firms Type III Family Firms 
 Founder 
CEO 
Descendant 
CEO 
Type II 
Family 
Firms Founder CEO 
Descendant 
CEO 
OLS Univariate 0.47 ** -0.22 ** -0.03  1.45 *** -0.25 * 
 (2.49)  (-2.04)  (-0.35)  (10.15)  (-1.86)  
OLS Multivariate 0.48 ** -0.16 ** -0.12  1.06 *** -0.30 *** 
 (2.55)  (-2.22)  (-1.50)  (4.47)  (-2.66)  
OLS Industry-adjusted q 0.51 *** 0.11  0.09  1.15 *** -0.13  
 (3.09)  (1.27)  (1.28)  (5.35)  (-1.26)  
Fixed Effects 0.34  -0.07  0.09  0.57 *** 0.07  
 (1.26)  (-0.40)  (0.66)  (2.65)  (0.41)  
Random Effects 0.56 *** -0.10  -0.01  0.88 *** -0.04  
 (2.68)  (-0.78)  (-0.10)  (5.65)  (-0.31)  
Treatment Effects (Heckman) 0.02  -0.58 ** -0.80 ** 1.87 *** -0.94 ** 
 (0.06)  (-2.26)  (-2.07)  (6.73)  (-2.20)  
0.28  0.28 ** 0.36 * -0.63 *** 0.36  Selection Parameter (λ)  
   from Heckman model (1.32)  (1.83)  (1.68)  (-3.74)  (1.56)  
No. family firms in category 66   194   262   149    122  
 
 
 
